Difference between revisions of "Security"

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m (Common security features)
(Common security features)
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* Boot password (like BIOS password)
 
* Boot password (like BIOS password)
* RAM wiping after each boot
 
 
* Signature verification - option to boot from payload only signed images
 
* Signature verification - option to boot from payload only signed images
* Support to encrypted block devices/volumes
+
[[Bayou]] / [[coreinfo]] / [[GRUB2]] have "BIOS password"-like feature, using SHA-1 hashes stored in NVRAM or the (flash) ROM chip.
 +
GRUB2 can also do signature verification of on-disk operating systems. All such features are in the payload domain since coreboot doesn't provide a user interface.
 +
[[Tianocore]] could probably be adapted to support either, too.
  
[[Bayou]] / [[coreinfo]] have "BIOS password"-like feature, using SHA-1 hashes stored in NVRAM or the (flash) ROM chip.
+
* RAM wiping after each boot
 +
Not very useful: The most interesting time would be right before power-off, which could be implemented in [[SMM]]. Unfortunately a cautious attacker just pulls the plug.
  
Coreboot can be full-secure solution for your hardware, without this issues, which have "legacy" BIOS:
+
* Support booting from encrypted block devices/volumes
 +
GRUB2 can do that.
  
 
== Current BIOS issues ==
 
== Current BIOS issues ==

Revision as of 15:24, 4 May 2014

This page explains how coreboot can help with various security aspects of your system, compared to closed-source, legacy BIOS/EFI/firmware implementations.

This page is work in progress!

Common security features

  • Boot password (like BIOS password)
  • Signature verification - option to boot from payload only signed images

Bayou / coreinfo / GRUB2 have "BIOS password"-like feature, using SHA-1 hashes stored in NVRAM or the (flash) ROM chip. GRUB2 can also do signature verification of on-disk operating systems. All such features are in the payload domain since coreboot doesn't provide a user interface. Tianocore could probably be adapted to support either, too.

  • RAM wiping after each boot

Not very useful: The most interesting time would be right before power-off, which could be implemented in SMM. Unfortunately a cautious attacker just pulls the plug.

  • Support booting from encrypted block devices/volumes

GRUB2 can do that.

Current BIOS issues

RAM wiping

SMI issues

ATA issues

Firewire issues

TPM issues