[coreboot] Feedback On Coreboot: the Solution to the Secure Boot Fiasco
r.marek at assembler.cz
Sun Jan 6 10:21:12 CET 2013
> And for those of us who simply do not trust Big Brother MS to forgo giving us an
> Atomic Wedgie... My next system upgrade will have Coreboot if that is even
> remotely possible. I prefer OPEN to Closed pretty much every time.
So far so good. What kind of system do you prefer? Is there any particular
system you want to see supported? I work on Asus F2A85-M or check the wiki
pages for other possibilites.
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 6:52 AM, Patrick Georgi <patrick at georgi-clan.de
> <mailto:patrick at georgi-clan.de>> wrote:
> Am 2013-01-05 15:03, schrieb Andrew Goodbody:
> Ahh, sorry I missed that detail didn't I? That's really good to know.
> It's not as obvious, since that's a payload feature, not coreboot itself.
> And here is the crux of the issue. Distribution and management of
> keys is a major problem be it coreboot or Secure Boot.
> The major issue is the (lack of) willingness of vendors to hand over control
> over devices to their customers (who _bought_ the devices) like they used to.
> Key management is a minor technical detail - chrome devices have the proper
> implementation (hardware switch to indicate user override), Shim provides
> the best possible solution within the UEFI secureboot framework, as long as
> key enrollment is at all possible.
> Agree 100%. I do not understand why people are lumping Intel in with
> Microsoft on this one.
> Probably because UEFI is considered Intel's brainchild, even though it's a
> huge committee these days.
> I actually find the fact that Microsoft bowed to the public outcry
> and added the requirement for key enrolment to be an encouraging
> thing. If there is a single message that is not fuelled by paranoia
> and FUD then changes can actually be made.
> The other reason for allowing secure boot to be disabled is Windows 7. And
> if they allow it to be disabled, it doesn't hurt to allow key enrollment.
> We don't know _what_ pressure made them change their mind. It's possible
> that PC vendors would have refused Windows 8 Logo for 2013/2014 devices to
> keep Windows 7 (or even XP) compatibility around for their business customers.
> If you want to discern Microsoft's actual intentions, it's best to look at
> the platforms that aren't bogged down by compatibility requirements: Win64
> introduced mandantory driver signatures (since old 32bit drivers didn't run
> anyway), Windows on ARM introduced mandantory Secure Boot (with no custom
> key enrollment in sight).
> Just FYI MS have been controlling PC hardware since they released the
> PC98 specification so this is not a new move on their part but it is
> an escalation.
> Sure, but it shows that pointing to the UEFI spec (and its siblings, PI and
> so on) isn't enough. What actually happens on devices out there is defined
> by Windows Logo requirements (and they're generally good ideas even, and
> forced BIOS vendors to fix their code for a while now. For example,
> Windows7+ explicitely tests that BIOS doesn't mess up the <1MB RAM area on
> suspend/wakeup, because BIOS commonly did so).
> - Verified boot processes work with coreboot and UEFI alike (within their
> respective world views)
> - UEFI Secure Boot is driven by Microsoft, not (as much) by Intel
> - Microsoft's motivation is partly to provide a secure environment (after
> their embarassing history of Windows (in)security)
> - Microsoft won't shed a tear if they get away with killing competition via
> "security" initiatives
> - UEFI Secure Boot key management is done by the old Microsoft/Verisign
> team. Probably out of convenience (they have some history of managing driver
> signatures), but politically unwise any maybe malign.
> So while Secure Boot is a nice idea if kept user-overrideable, it's in the
> wrong hands with no existing process to resolve that (UEFI Forum is the only
> semi public instance in that ecosystemen, it's paid-membership based, and
> they're also not responsible for the implementation of key management we have).
> The remaining theoretical option within the UEFI ecosystem is to pressure
> the UEFI Forum members to define secure boot overrides mandantory on all
> device classes in all future versions of UEFI. That way control over this
> dangerous feature is taken away from Microsoft and brought into the forum,
> which has a broader interest base than just Microsoft's.
> I doubt that could happen, but I'll be truly happy to be proven wrong here.
> The other option is to keep coreboot viable. Since I'm more technically
> inclined, that what I'll aim for.
> coreboot mailing list: coreboot at coreboot.org <mailto:coreboot at coreboot.org>
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