[coreboot] Feedback On Coreboot: the Solution to the Secure Boot Fiasco
rhyotte at gmail.com
Sun Jan 6 11:10:42 CET 2013
I have been watching the Intel Haswell cpu's. The Intel GPU initiative in
linux seems pretty strong lately.
Have a good one,
On Sun, Jan 6, 2013 at 1:21 AM, Rudolf Marek <r.marek at assembler.cz> wrote:
> And for those of us who simply do not trust Big Brother MS to forgo giving
>> us an
>> Atomic Wedgie... My next system upgrade will have Coreboot if that is even
>> remotely possible. I prefer OPEN to Closed pretty much every time.
> So far so good. What kind of system do you prefer? Is there any particular
> system you want to see supported? I work on Asus F2A85-M or check the wiki
> pages for other possibilites.
>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 6:52 AM, Patrick Georgi <patrick at georgi-clan.de
>> <mailto:patrick at georgi-clan.de**>> wrote:
>> Am 2013-01-05 15:03, schrieb Andrew Goodbody:
>> Ahh, sorry I missed that detail didn't I? That's really good to
>> It's not as obvious, since that's a payload feature, not coreboot
>> And here is the crux of the issue. Distribution and management of
>> keys is a major problem be it coreboot or Secure Boot.
>> The major issue is the (lack of) willingness of vendors to hand over
>> over devices to their customers (who _bought_ the devices) like they
>> used to.
>> Key management is a minor technical detail - chrome devices have the
>> implementation (hardware switch to indicate user override), Shim
>> the best possible solution within the UEFI secureboot framework, as
>> long as
>> key enrollment is at all possible.
>> Agree 100%. I do not understand why people are lumping Intel in
>> Microsoft on this one.
>> Probably because UEFI is considered Intel's brainchild, even though
>> it's a
>> huge committee these days.
>> I actually find the fact that Microsoft bowed to the public outcry
>> and added the requirement for key enrolment to be an encouraging
>> thing. If there is a single message that is not fuelled by
>> and FUD then changes can actually be made.
>> The other reason for allowing secure boot to be disabled is Windows
>> 7. And
>> if they allow it to be disabled, it doesn't hurt to allow key
>> We don't know _what_ pressure made them change their mind. It's
>> that PC vendors would have refused Windows 8 Logo for 2013/2014
>> devices to
>> keep Windows 7 (or even XP) compatibility around for their business
>> If you want to discern Microsoft's actual intentions, it's best to
>> look at
>> the platforms that aren't bogged down by compatibility requirements:
>> introduced mandantory driver signatures (since old 32bit drivers
>> didn't run
>> anyway), Windows on ARM introduced mandantory Secure Boot (with no
>> key enrollment in sight).
>> Just FYI MS have been controlling PC hardware since they released
>> PC98 specification so this is not a new move on their part but it
>> an escalation.
>> Sure, but it shows that pointing to the UEFI spec (and its siblings,
>> PI and
>> so on) isn't enough. What actually happens on devices out there is
>> by Windows Logo requirements (and they're generally good ideas even,
>> forced BIOS vendors to fix their code for a while now. For example,
>> Windows7+ explicitely tests that BIOS doesn't mess up the <1MB RAM
>> area on
>> suspend/wakeup, because BIOS commonly did so).
>> - Verified boot processes work with coreboot and UEFI alike (within
>> respective world views)
>> - UEFI Secure Boot is driven by Microsoft, not (as much) by Intel
>> - Microsoft's motivation is partly to provide a secure environment
>> their embarassing history of Windows (in)security)
>> - Microsoft won't shed a tear if they get away with killing
>> competition via
>> "security" initiatives
>> - UEFI Secure Boot key management is done by the old
>> team. Probably out of convenience (they have some history of managing
>> signatures), but politically unwise any maybe malign.
>> So while Secure Boot is a nice idea if kept user-overrideable, it's
>> in the
>> wrong hands with no existing process to resolve that (UEFI Forum is
>> the only
>> semi public instance in that ecosystemen, it's paid-membership based,
>> they're also not responsible for the implementation of key management
>> we have).
>> The remaining theoretical option within the UEFI ecosystem is to
>> the UEFI Forum members to define secure boot overrides mandantory on
>> device classes in all future versions of UEFI. That way control over
>> dangerous feature is taken away from Microsoft and brought into the
>> which has a broader interest base than just Microsoft's.
>> I doubt that could happen, but I'll be truly happy to be proven wrong
>> The other option is to keep coreboot viable. Since I'm more
>> inclined, that what I'll aim for.
>> coreboot mailing list: coreboot at coreboot.org <mailto:
>> coreboot at coreboot.org>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the coreboot